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Imagine that one player, the "incumbent", competes with several "entrants". Each entrant 
competes only with the incumbent, but observes play in all contests.  Previous work shows that, 
as more and more entrants are added, the incumbent's reputation may dominate play of the game, 
if the entrants arefaced  in sequence. We identify conditions  under which similar results obtain 
when the  entrants are faced  simultaneously, and we  find specifications  in  which adding more 
simultaneous entrants has a dramatically different effect. We also show that, with either sequential 
or simultaneous  play, incumbents need not prefer the situation in which their reputations can 
and do dominate play to the "informationally isolated" case in which each entrant observes only 
play in its own contest. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper continues  the  study of  reputation effects in games in which  one  player is 
engaged in "predatory conflict" with several opponents,  each of whom is engaged only 
with the one.  In line with the recent literature, we will call the single player the incumbent 
and its several opponents the entrants. We refer to the competition between the incumbent 
and one of its opponents as the basic contest. The notion of reputation enters into these 
games because each player is unsure about how its opponent(s)  will play, and each uses 
the  previous  play  by  its  opponent(s)  to  help  predict  future actions.  Accordingly,  in 
selecting current actions, each player must consider how this will affect not only immediate 
rewards but  also  the  predictions,  and  hence  future play,  of  its  opponent(s).  Using 
reputation as a loose synonym for those predictions, each player chooses current actions 
based in part on the reputation that will be built or maintained.  Previous work (Kreps 
and Wilson (1982),  Milgrom and Roberts (1982))  showed that, in some situations, the 
incumbent's reputation would, as more and more entrants were added, come to dominate 
play of the game, if the entrants were faced  in sequence.'  Our aim is to  see whether 
similar results obtain when the entrants are faced  simultaneously.  Along the way, we 
will also sharpen what is known about models in which opponents are faced sequentially. 
The models that we examine yield two basic insights.  First, the maintenance of a 
reputation in equilibrium depends on a tradeoff between the short run costs of maintaining 
that reputation (including the opportunity costs of not milking it most fully, if that would 
lead to  its demise)  and the  longer run benefits that accrue from it.  In the sequential 
contests models,  the incumbent's short run cost is the cost of fighting a single entrant, 
while its long run benefits accrue from the many opponents to be faced in future contests. 
If the reputation has  a positive  value  against each  opponent,  then  as the  number of 
opponents grows, the short run cost is eventually outweighed by the long run benefits. 
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There is no similar effect on the incentives of the entrants to invest in reputation, and so 
the reputation of the single incumbent dominates. 
The same basic tradeoff arises in simultaneous  contest models,  but with generally 
ambiguous results because the short run costs rise with the number of opponents.  Long 
run benefits rise as well, but only when the long run benefits rise more quickly than short 
run costs will we find that, as with sequential contests, the reputation of the one incumbent 
dominates.  This happens in some formulations of simultaneous play, but it does not in 
others that are equally natural.  The simple addition of opponents  does not ensure that the 
reputation  of the one will dominate, even when the net benefits  per opponent of a particular 
reputation  are  positive. The  reputation  of the one only dominates if the structure  of competition 
causes the long term benefits to outweigh short run costs. We will show how the ability of 
the entrants to reenter influences the direction of this comparison. 
Second,  the  early  literature might  be  interpreted as  suggesting  that  incumbents 
generally favour conditions  under which their reputations can (and do)  dominate play. 
Compare the informationally  linked situation above, in which each entrant observes earlier 
play in all contests, to a situation of informational  isolation, in which each entrant observes 
only play in its own contest.  (The comparison is between the incumbent's expected value 
from N  linked contests and its expected value in  N  informationally isolated contests; 
not N  linked vs. one isolated.)  One might have thought that whenever the incumbent's 
reputation dominates linked play, the incumbent prefers linkage to isolation.  Indeed, 
this is the case in the basic model of Kreps and Wilson (1982).  But a small variation on 
their model  (which is in the spirit of the basic model of  Milgrom and Roberts (1982)) 
shows that this is not the case in general.  Under linkage, the incumbent may defend his 
reputation because the  short run costs  of  keeping  it are outweighed  by the long term 
opportunity  losses that he would sustain if it were lost.  Under isolation,  he may be able 
to avoid the short run costs, and yet not suffer long term opportunity losses, the best of 
all possible worlds. 
The paper begins, in Section 2, with a very brief recapitulation of the basic model 
of the early literature. We present a formulation a bit more complex than in Kreps and 
Wilson and a bit less  complex  than in  Milgrom and  Roberts.  This added complexity 
allows us to conclude Section 2 with our first point: an incumbent might prefer informa- 
tional isolation  to informational linkage, even in cases in which the incumbent would 
fight to maintain its reputation. 
In the early literature (and in Section 2), the individual contest has a very simple 
temporal structure: First the entrant moves,  and then the incumbent responds.  Simul- 
taneous contests of this sort would be uninteresting: if entrants made their (only) moves 
before the incumbent had to act, the incumbent's play could not influence the entrants' 
future actions,  and so there would  be no  reputation effect.  For this reason, we use  a 
richer model of the individual  contest, the concession  game found  in the back half of 
Kreps and Wilson.  This is roughly a game of war of attrition, in which a player wins if 
its opponent concedes first. (If neither concedes, then both are losers.)  Section 3 begins 
with a brief recapitulation of the equilibrium of the single contest if played in isolation. 
Then we look  at sequences  of these contests, and we confirm that the results from the 
early literature  continue to hold.  (Analysis of this latter point is consigned to an appendix.) 
Sections 4 and 5 concern simultaneous play.  In Section 4 we analyse a formulation 
in  which  the  reputation of  the  incumbent  does  not  dominate  play  as the  number of 
entrants increases.  Instead,  the  number  of  entrants is  irrelevant to  the  equilibrium 
outcomes.  The key to the formulation in Section 4 is that if and when the incumbent 
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some  of  the  entrants.  In this  case,  the  short run cost  of  maintaining a reputation is 
proportional to the number of entrants there are remaining, as are the reputation's long 
term benefits.  Thus, changing the number of entrants has no effect on the nature of the 
equilibrium. 
In contrast, in Section 5 we formulate simultaneous play so that the incumbent, if 
it does  ever concede,  accrues no further benefits from contests it has already won.  In 
the basic tradeoff, costs  are proportional to the number of  entrants who  have not yet 
conceded,  while  the gain  from maintaining the reputation is proportional to the  total 
number of all entrants.  Thus there is the potential that benefits will exceed  costs, and 
the  incumbent's  reputation  will  dominate.  This  does  happen,  for  (at  least)  one 
specification of the model.  In Subsection 5.1, we present the basic model.  In Subsection 
5.2, we find the equilibrium for a simple case with two entrants. Even with two entrants, 
we are able to observe subtle effects brought about by linkage.  In 5.3 we show how to 
compute the equilibrium for any number of entrants. Asymptotic results are obtained in 
Subsection 5.4; these are in direct accord with those obtained when the individual contests 
are played in sequence. 
Our use of terminology such as incumbent, entrant, simultaneous entry and reentry 
is meant to suggest applications to industrial organization, but the reader should not be 
misled by these terms into imagining that we intend the most obvious interpretations of 
them.  In particular, when there is simultaneous  entry, one naturally imagines a single 
market into which a number of entrants enter at once.  One would expect in that situation 
that the actions  of  any one  entrant would  have a direct effect on the payoffs of  other 
entrants. This would be an interesting game to investigate, but it is not the one that we 
examine.  In the game considered here, each entrant's payoffs depend on its own actions 
and those of the incumbent; other entrants affect it only insofar as their actions change 
the  actions  of  the  incumbent.  The incumbent is  concerned  with  its  many opponents 
learning about it through actions  it takes in other contests; entrants do not care what 
they reveal about themselves except to their single opponent.  This is not to say that the 
entrants are not worried about their reputation, but that they are only concerned about 
their reputation with the single incumbent. 
The  models  studied  here  only  continue  to  scratch the  surface  of  the  reputation 
phenomenon.  In particular, a priori asymmetries in the characteristics of the entrants 
lead to many interesting effects.  We hope to report on some of those effects in a sequel. 
2.  SEQUENTIAL  PLAY  WITH  SIMPLE  CONTESTS-A  RECAPITULATION 
Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) deal with models in which 
the individual contest has the following basic form.  An entrant decides whether to enter 
or stay out of a particular market. If the entrant stays out, the contest ends.  If it enters, 
the incumbent must react, either by fighting or acquiescing. With prior probability 1 -p?, 
the incumbent's payoffs in the contest are: if the entrant stays out, the incumbent nets 
a >  0; if the entrant enters and the incumbent acquiesces,  the incumbent nets 0; if the 
entrant enters and the incumbent fights, the incumbent nets -1.  And with prior probability 
p0, the incumbent has a strictly dominant strategy to fight any entry.  For the entrant, 
with prior probability 1 -  qo, staying out nets 0, entering and being met with acquiescence 
nets b > 0, and being fought yields payoff -1.  And with prior probability q?, the entrant 
does better to enter than to stay out, regardless of the incumbent's reaction.  We refer to 
the incumbent as being  weak if it has the first payoff structure; the incumbent is strong 
otherwise.  And the entrant is weak or strong, if it has the first or second payoff structure, 544  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
respectively.  Since  strong entrants and incumbents have  dominant strategies, we  will 
usually  be  lax  in  specifying  equilibrium strategies and  equilibrium expected  payoffs, 
giving these for weak types of players only.2 
The contest above has a unique sequential equilibrium. If there is entry, the incumbent 
acquiesces if weak, so a weak entrant nets expected payoff (1 - p?)b +p?(-1)  if it enters. 
It enters, therefore, if p0 < b/(b + 1), stays out if the strict inequality is reversed, and is 
indifferent if there is equality.3 
Now  imagine  that  the  incumbent  faces  a  sequence  of  entrants, indexed  by  n= 
N, .. .,  1. Entrant N  is faced first; after the contest against entrant N  is completed, N -  1 
is faced,  and so  on.  Each entrant is weak with probability 1 -  q?, independent  of the 
others. The incumbent is weak in all contests or strong in all of them, with prior probability 
p0 that it is strong.  For a strong incumbent, fighting in all markets where there is entry 
is strictly dominant.  The weak incumbent's payoff total is the sum of payoffs in the N 
contests, where payoffs in each contest are as above. 
If the N  contests were conducted under conditions of informational isolation, where 
entrant n does not observe the actions of the incumbent in earlier contests, then entrant 
n would begin its contest with prior p0 that the incumbent is strong, and a weak incumbent 
would acquiesce if there is entry. Hence weak entrants enter if and only if po < b/(b + 1). 
In this case, the weak incumbent nets zero in every contest; if po>  b/(b + 1), then the 
weak incumbent nets an expected (1 -  qo)a per contest, or N(1 -  qo)a overall. 
Things are much more complex  if the  N  contests are played under conditions  of 
informational linkage, where entrant n  observes the past behaviour of  the incumbent. 
Then, if the incumbent acquiesces  in contest  n, it reveals that it is weak.  This, it turns 
out, guarantees that all subsequent entrants will enter in at least one sequential equilibrium 
of the game.  Hence the weak incumbent, in choosing  actions in contest n, must weigh 
the short term costs of fighting (-1)  against the long term affect that acquiescence will 
have on its reputation, and hence on the entry decisions  of subsequent entrants.  From 
the early literature, we obtain the following  result. 
Proposition 1.  When the incumbent  faces  N entrants in sequential play of the simple 
contest, and the contests are informationally  linked, there is a unique sequential equilibrium 
outcome.  The nature of  the  equilibrium outcome for  large  N  depends on  the sign  of 
q0  -a/(a+  1). 
(a)  If qo> a/(a  + 1), then the incumbent, if weak, acquiesces at the first entry, which 
occurs "early" in the game.4  Hence as N->  oo,  the weak incumbent's average payoff per 
contest approaches  zero. 
(b)  If q?<a/(a+  1), then  for every po>O  there is a number n(p?) such that, if there 
are n(p?) or more contests left to go, the incumbent  is certain tofight any entry. Accordingly, 
weak entrants with label n(p?)  or higher choose not to enter, and the weak incumbent's 
average payoff per contest approaches (1 -  qo)a -  qo as N -> oo. 
The early literature derived the unique equilibrium outcome, obtaining the asymptotic 
payoff  functions  as  a  corollary.  A  simpler  argument is  available  for  obtaining  the 
asymptotic results, as  developed  in  Fudenberg and  Levine (1987).  A  synopsis  of  the 
simpler argument can be given.  Imagine that the incumbent follows the strategy of never 
conceding.  Since the weak entrants will stay out unless the probability of being fought 
is sufficiently small, every time that a weak entrant enters and is fought the probability 
that the incumbent is strong must rise by an amount that is bounded  away from zero. FUDENBERG  & KREPS  SIMULTANEOUS  OPPONENTS  545 
That is, each time the incumbent is called upon to invest in his reputation by a weak 
opponent  (with positive probability), doing so must have a nonnegligible  effect on that 
reputation (measured by the posterior probability that the incumbent is strong).  Thus 
there is a number k independent of  N  such that if there is positive probability of entry 
by k (or more) weak entrants, then fighting by the incumbent leads to a reputation strong 
enough to  deter all future weak entrants.  This shows that the incumbent's asymptotic 
average payoff is bounded below by a (1 -  qo) -  qo. If this expression is positive, then the 
bound  is tight,  since  the  incumbent must fight the  strong entrants to  have  a positive 
average value asymptotically.  In the case a (1 -  qo) -  qo  < 0, then even if all weak entrants 
are deterred, the average value of fighting is negative.  Hence the incumbent (if weak) 
will acquiesce early on, for an asymptotic average value of zero. 
The case  qo  < a/(a  + 1) has received the most attention in the literature. Here the 
incumbent can credibly play the strategy "always fight" because the long-run consequences 
of  acquiescence  (entry by  subsequent weak  entrants) outweigh  the  short-run costs  of 
fighting.  To emphasize the crucial nature of the basic cost/benefit  tradeoff, consider a 
formulation where the various contests have different sizes.  Payoffs in the last contest 
(contest  1) are exactly the same as before.  Payoffs in contest n are a + 1 times those in 
contest n -  1; for example, in contest 2 the incumbent's cost of fighting is a + 1, and his 
gain from deterring entry is a(a + 1).5 With these payoffs, it does not pay the incumbent 
to fight today, even if so doing deters all future entry. Thus, if p0 < b/(b + 1), for any N 
the unique equilibrium is for all of the entrants to enter. This means that the incumbent 
can deter all future weak entrants by fighting, but the cost of  doing  so outweighs any 
conceivable future gain.  It is the cost! benefit tradeoff, and not the  frequency of play or the 
number  of opponents  per se, which is the key to understanding  reputation effects. 
When moving to a situation of informational linkage favours the incumbent's invest- 
ment in  reputation, we  will  say that the  incumbent has  gained  in  strategic backbone. 
Naturally, this stiffened backbone comes at a cost.  The incumbent must fight all those 
that are not scared off which, in our simple model,  amounts to all the strong entrants. 
A stiffened strategic backbone brings with it a loss of strategic flexibility.  Milgrom and 
Roberts make clear that this loss of strategic flexibility may sometimes have a cost that 
outweighs the benefits from the stiffened backbone, so that the incumbent's reputation 
need  not  dominate  play.  This occurs when  qo>a/(a+1).  Moreover, even when  the 
benefits of a stiffened backbone outweigh the costs of lost flexibility given that markets 
are linked, the (weak) incumbent may be worse off for having to make the choice. 
Would the incumbent, if weak, prefer that the contests take place under conditions 
of informational linkage or informational isolation?  Refer to Figure 1. 
When qo> a/(a  +1)  and p0 < b/(b +1),  the weak incumbent is indifferent between 
linkage and isolation.  All the entrants enter if there is informational isolation, and it is 
too costly to maintain a stiff backbone with linkage. 
When qo< a/(a  + 1) and po< b/(b+  1), informational linkage is preferred. Here the 
stiffened backbone deters some entrants, whereas none  are deterred if the contests are 
informationally isolated,  and the gain from a stiffened backbone outweighs the cost of 
maintaining it. 
When po>  b/(b + 1), in contrast, the weak incumbent strictly prefers informational 
isolation.  The incumbent's ex ante reputation is sufficient to deter the weak entrants, so 
that moving  from informational  isolation  to  linkage  (obtaining  a  stiffened backbone) 
provides no gains.  The accompanying loss  of strategic flexibility means, however, that 
the weak incumbent must fight all the strong entrants that come along, if it wants to keep 
its reputation.  The weak incumbent either gives up the reputation altogether if it costs 546  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
0 
-:  (a)  (b) 
CO  (d)(O)  0 
0  b/(b+1)  1 
p0-prior probability  of 
strong incumbent 
FIGURE  1 
Isolaticn  vs. linkage  with the simple contest. With informational  linkage,  the weak incumbent's  asymptotic 
payoff  per contest  is zero in regions  (a) and (b), and a - (a + 1)q?  in regions  (c) and (d). With  isolation,  the 
asymptotic  payoffs are zero in regions (a) and (d) and a(I -  qo) in regions (b) and (c).  Hence the weak 
incumbent  prefers  linkage  in region  (d), isolation  in (b) and (c), and  is indifferent  between  isolation  and  linkage 
in region  (a). 
too  much to  maintain (if  qo> b/(b + 1)),  or it maintains the reputation at the cost  of 
fighting the strong entrants (if qo  < b/(b +1)). 
The early literature focuses on the second case, where p0 and qo are each small. This 
particular focus is natural if "strong" types are interpreted as "irrational" firms. But the 
case q?< a/(a  + 1) and po>  b/(b + 1) should also be borne in mind.  The first inequality 
ensures that, for large N,  the  incumbent's reputation dominates  play  of  the game.  If 
forced  to  choose  between  having  reputation  for  relative  strength or  having  one  for 
weakness, then the weak incumbent prefers strength.  But the weak incumbent prefers 
most of all that it does  not have to prove itself, because it began a priori with a good 
reputation.  It will  fight, in  equilibrium, but it does  so  more to  avoid  losing  its good 
reputation and keep scared those  who  would  be  scared without linkage than to  scare 
those who would not otherwise be. 
3.  THE  BASIC  CONCESSION  GAME 
The early literature makes use of a very simple contest, where the entrant moved once, 
and then the incumbent responded.  To obtain interesting analyses of simultaneous play 
against many opponents, we need a contest in which the entrants have nontrivial responses 
to the incumbent's play.  We use, for the rest of this paper, the concession game of Kreps 
and Wilson  (1982, Section  4)  as the basic contest, and in this section  we describe the 
game and its equilibrium.  (Notation  will be changed slightly from Kreps and Wilson 
(1982).) 
There are two players, an incumbent  and an entrant. The game is played in continuous 
time, over the interval from time one to zero.  Time runs backwards.  At each time t, if 
neither player has yet conceded to the other, either can choose to do so.  As soon as one 
side or the other concedes,  the game ends.  If neither side  concedes  by time zero, the 
game ends. 
As in  Section  2,  each  player is one  of  two  types,  strong or  weak, with the prior 
probability that the incumbent [entrant] is strong being po[q?], independent of the type 
of the other player.  A player's type is private information. FUDENBERG  & KREPS  SIMULTANEOUS  OPPONENTS  547 
Payoffs to  a  player  depend  on  which  (if  either)  party concedes  first, when  the 
concession occurs, and the player's type.  For strong players (both incumbent and entrant), 
it is a dominant strategy never to concede.  As in Section 2, then, we will be sloppy and 
sometimes drop the modifier "weak" in discussing the equilibrium strategies of the (weak) 
incumbent  and  entrant.  For weak types  of  player, it is  best to  have  one's  opponent 
concede,  second best to concede  oneself,  and worst to have an opponent that does not 
concede  while not conceding  oneself.  Rewards and losses  are proportional to the time 
periods over which they are received/incurred.  Specifically, there are constants a > 0 and 
b > 0 with the following  assignment of rewards. 
Suppose  the  entrant concedes  first, at time  t.  Thus the two  fight for a period  of 
length 1-  t, and the incumbent "wins" for a period of length t. The incumbent (if weak) 
nets reward 
at-(I  -t), 
or a per unit time that it wins, with a loss of -1  per unit time during the fight. And the 
entrant (if weak) nets -(1  -  t), or zero per unit time after it concedes,  and -1  per unit 
time during the fight.  If the incumbent concedes  first at time t, the (weak) entrant nets 
bt -  (1 -  t) and the (weak) incumbent nets -(1  -  t).  That is, the cost of fighting is minus 
one per unit time as before, conceding first nets zero for the remainder of the game to 
the side that concedes, and the entrant gets a reward of b per unit time if the incumbent 
concedes first. If neither side concedes before time zero, then each loses a total of -1L6 
In the equilibrium to this game, the two (weak) players engage in a game of "chicken". 
If neither concedes at the outset, each thereafter concedes at a "rate" until such time as 
the one or the other has conceded  or each is certain that the other is tough.  Precisely, 
suppose that at time t neither side has yet conceded.  Play to this time has led to (Bayesian) 
posterior reassessments concerning the toughness of the two players-p,  will denote the 
probability that the incumbent is tough, and q, the probability that the entrant is tough. 
We hypothesize an equilibrium where the incumbent (if weak, and if it has not conceded 
by time  t) will  concede  over  the  period  (t, t -  h)  with  probability  Tr(t, pt, q,)h,  up to terms 
that are o(h),  and the  (weak)  entrant with probability p(t, pt, q,)h + o(h).  (That is,  Tr 
and p give hazard rates for the concession  probabilities.) 
Since  the  (weak)  incumbent  is  (supposed  to  be)  playing  this  mixed  strategy in 
equilibrium, it must be indifferent between immediate concession  at time t and waiting 
until time t -  h and then conceding.  The former nets zero for the remainder of the game. 
The latter has potential costs and benefits. I  With probability close to one, the entrant will 
not concede  over this time period, and the costs will total -h.  But there is a chance of 
order h, namely (1 -  q,)ph, that the entrant does concede before time t -  h. This involves 
the marginal probability that the entrant is weak (1 -  q,) times the conditional probability 
that the entrant will concede  if weak (ph).  In this case, the benefit to the incumbent is 
at.  Hence (up to terms of order o(h))  the weak incumbent is indifferent between the two 
strategies if and only if 
0=  -h  +(  -q,)phat. 
Dropping  the  h  and  repeating the  argument for the  weak  entrant gives the  first two 
equilibrium conditions: 
0  a-1  + (  -  q,)pat  (3.1a) 
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If the weak incumbent does use the strategy Ir, then p, will change through time.  If 
ever there is a concession,  this of course reveals that the incumbent is weak, and Pt will 
drop to zero.  But as long as there is no concession  (and Ir >  0), p, should rise.  Simple 
application of Bayes' formula yields 
pi,=p,(1-p,)IrT  and  4,=q,(1-q,)p.  (3.2) 
(See Kreps and Wilson (1982).  Here, p3,  means dp,/d(-t),  since time runs backwards.) 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) and dividing one equation by the other, we see that posteriors 
will evolve along a curve 
dq  qbkbl  =-  or  q=kpb/a 
dp  pa 
for some constant k > 0. 
We assert that k = 1 is required if this is to give an equilibrium. Suppose, for example, 
that k < 1. Then, tracing back through (3.1) and (3.2), one can see that, before time zero, 
Pt will reach one at a time when  qt =  k <  1.  Imagine that the incumbent (if weak) tries 
the strategy of no concession  until just after this time.  According to (3.1), the expected 
costs and benefits up to this time net out to zero.  And at this time the entrant is convinced 
that the incumbent is tough.  If weak (which happens with probability 1 -  k), the entrant 
drops out immediately.  Hence waiting until this time nets the (weak) incumbent a strictly 
positive  expected  value, and it could not be an equilibrium for it to use  vr. Similarly, 
k>  1 is precluded.  So,  to  have  an equilibrium of  the  sort described, posteriors must 
evolve along the curve 
q =  pb/a  (3.3) 
If (q?, po) falls along this curve, we do have an equilibrium.  (To see this involves a 
little checking by the reader.)  What if not?  Refer to  Figure 2.  If (q?, po) falls  in the 
region labelled Region I, with q0 "small" relative to p0, then the game begins as follows: 
at time one,  the entrant (if  weak)  concedes  immediately with probability sufficient to 
make the  posterior probability that it is tough  if  it doesn't  concede  equal to  (PO)  b/a 
Thereafter, we  follow  the  equilibrium described  above.  From Region  II, the  (weak) 
incumbent concedes  immediately with positive probability so that (once  again) if there 
is no concession,  the posteriors lie along the curve. 
50  Region 11  / 
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FIGURE  2 
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These strategies do give an equilibrium.  If we lie in Region I, for example, then the 
(weak) entrant randomizes at the start. This is a best response by the entrant: Dropping 
out nets zero for the entrant, as does continued fighting (as the posteriors begin to move 
along the curve). 
Note  that for each  (weak)  player, any positive  expected  value  from the  game is 
realized right at the start.  After the initial randomization (if any), if the game has not 
ended, the expected value to both sides (if weak) is zero. 
Using the methods of  Fudenberg and Tirole (1986),  one  can show that this is the 
unique equilibrium of this game. 
We introduce this concession  game to study reputation effects when the incumbent 
plays many entrants simultaneously.  But before doing so, we wish to record that sequential 
play of the concession  game yields the same asymptotic results as does sequential play 
with the simple contests of  Section 2.  Specifically, imagine that the incumbent faces a 
sequence  of  entrants, n = N,  N -  1, . . .,  1.  Each entrant is strong with probability qo, 
independent of the others, while the incumbent is either strong in all contests or in none 
of them.  Entrant N  is faced  first, for the full unit of time, followed  by entrant N -  1, 
and so  on.  Under informational isolation,  the  equilibrium is simply  N  copies  of  the 
equilibrium just described. 
Equilibrium play of the  N  contests under informational linkage is quite complex. 
We provide the sequential equilibrium of this game in the appendix, and we (only) record 
here that the incumbent's asymptotic payoffs are as with simple contests. 
Proposition 2.  Imagine that the incumbent  faces  N entrants in sequential play of the 
concession game. 
(a)  If qo  > a/ (a + 1),  the incumbent's average payoff per contest approaches zero as 
N -  co.  Moreover, the incumbent (if weak) concedes "early" on in the game. 
(b)  If qo  < a/ (a + 1),  the incumbent's average payoff approaches a (1 -  qo) -  qo.  For 
"most" of the game, the incumbent will not concede whether weak or strong, so that weak 
entrants capitulate at the outset. 
The appendix should be consulted for exact statements. We note also that the asymptotic 
average values  can be  derived  more simply  than  in  the  appendix,  using  the  general 
machinery of Fudenberg and Levine (1987). 
The comparison of the payoff to the weak incumbent under conditions of informa- 
tional isolation and linkage are also as before. 
Proposition 3.  (Refer to Figure 3.) 
(a)  If qo  > a/ (a + 1) and po < (q?) a/  b,  then the incumbent  is asymptotically  indifferent 
between  linkage and isolation; under  either  regime,  its expected  valueper contest  has limit  zero. 
(b)  If po> (a/(a  + 1))a/b  and a/(a  + 1) ?  qo  (pO)  b/a  then the incumbent  asymptoti- 
cally favours informational isolation. Indeed, under isolation the incumbent  has a positive 
expected  payoffper contest, whereas its expected  payoffper contestfalls to zero with informa- 
tional linkage. 
(c)  IfpO> (a/(a  + 1)) a/b  and q? < a/(a  + 1), then the incumbent  asymptoticallyfavours 
informational isolation.  The incumbent has a positive average payoff in either regime; in 
particular,  its reputation  dominates play for large n under conditions of linkage. But it loses 
more  from the loss of strategic  flexibility than it gains from inducing more weak entrants to 
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FIGURE  3 
Isolation  vs. linkage with the concession  game as the single contest. In region (a), the weak incumbent  is 
asymptotically  indifferent,  as it nets  zero  per  contest  in either  case. In regions  (b) and (c) isolation  is preferred. 
Note that with informational  linkage,  the weak  incumbent  maintains  the reputation  in region  (c) and gives it 
up in (b). In region  (d), the weak  incumbent  prefers  linkage. See Proposition  3 for further  details. 
(d)  Ifp?<  (a/(a  + 1))a/b  and q?  < a/(a  + 1), then the incumbent  asymptoticallyfavours 
informational  linkage. The gainsfrom stiffened strategic backbone  outweigh the costs of lost 
strategic  flexibility. 
The proof is a simple matter of algebra, given Proposition 2, and it is left to the reader. 
4.  SIMULTANEOUS  PLAY WITH  CAPTURED  CONTESTS 
Now we turn to simultaneous play of the concession game. We imagine that one incumbent 
faces N  entrants in N  distinct contests which are played simultaneously, over the same 
unit length of time.  As before, the incumbent is either tough in all contests or in none, 
and the entrants are either weak or tough, independent of each other and of the incumbent. 
Entrants observe what the incumbent does in all the contests and update their assessments 
accordingly.  We restrict attention to equilibria in which the incumbent, if it concedes in 
any contest, must concede simultaneously in all contests in which the entrant has not yet 
conceded.  (This is not imposed by restricting the strategies available to the incumbent. 
Rather, it will be equilibrium behaviour in all the equilibria we examine.)  Each entrant 
gets payoffs from its own contest; the incumbent payoff is the sum of its payoffs in each 
contest. 
Note  well that when facing many entrants in sequence, the incumbent has a much 
longer horizon over which to amortize investment in its reputation than does any single 
entrant.  Thus it is "natural" with sequential contests that, in some  cases  at least, the 
incumbent finds that the long-run benefits of a reputation outweigh its short-run costs, 
while the entrants find that reputation's costs outweigh its benefits.  With simultaneous 
contests,  the  incumbent and the  entrants amortize investments in reputation over the 
same horizon.  Thus the effect of increasing the number of simultaneous entrants is not 
obvious  a priori. 
At this point, the specification of the simultaneous contest game is incomplete.  What 
happens if some, but not all, of the entrants have conceded by date t, at which point the 
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contests.  But what happens in the contests that the incumbent has already won?  (Note 
that this question is moot with sequential contests.)  Does the (weak) incumbent continue 
to get the reward (a per unit time) from those contests it has already won, or does it lose 
those flows of rewards for the time remaining?  And what of the entrants that conceded 
previously?  Do they continue to receive zero for the remainder of the game, or can they 
reenter to get b per unit time for the time that remains? 
In this section, we will complete the description of the game according to a no reentry 
scenario.  The incumbent retains the rewards from contests already won,  and entrants 
who conceded earlier get no benefit from the (subsequent) concession  of the incumbent. 
Proposition 4.  In the no reentry  scenario, the equilibrium  strategies  for the incumbent 
and the entrants are the same whether contests are linked informationally or are isolated. 
These  strategies are independent  of the number  N of entrants. The expected  payoffsfor weak 
entrants  are precisely as in the one-vs.  -one equilibrium  of Section 3, while the expected  payoff 
to the incumbent is simply N  times the expected reward  from the equilibrium  of Section 3. 
In saying that the equilibrium strategies are the same, we mean that (after initial 
randomizations) each entrant uses the hazard rate p defined in (3.1a), and the incumbent 
uses the hazard rate 7r  defined in (3.lb).  Posteriors evolve along the curve q =  pb/a  (unless, 
of course, a player concedes).  Initial randomizations are as in the one-vs.-one equilibrium: 
In Region I of Figure 2, the (weak) entrants simultaneously and independently randomize 
at the start of the game, so that the posterior probability that each remaining entrant is 
tough is  (pO)b/a,  independent  of the toughness of the others.  In Region II, the (weak) 
incumbent undertakes an initial randomization.7 
All this follows  from the equations analogous to (3.1).  Suppose we reach a point 
where k of the  N  entrants have not yet conceded.  The indifference equation for each 
entrant, which determines 7r,  is unchanged from before.  For the incumbent, things are 
slightly more complex.  There are k entrants to fight, so the rate of cost expenditure is 
-k.  But there are k entrants that might concede, and if each is conceding (independently) 
at hazard rate (1 -  q,)p  (unconditional  on  type),  then  the  hazard rate for the  "next" 
concession is k(l -  q,)p, giving the incumbent a rate of expected gains equal to k(l -  q,)pat. 
(Note  here the use of the no reentry scenario assumption that, if an entrant concedes, 
the  incumbent  is  able  to  "bank" the  amount  at.)  Thus the  incumbent's indifference 
equation  is 
O  = -k  + k(l -  q,)pat,  (4.1) 
which, cancelling the k, gives us the pair of equations (3.1).  Both the cost (per unit time) 
and the expected benefits (fixing p) from continuing to fight rise linearly with k, so the 
equilibrating concession rate is unchanged with changes in k. Hence the old equilibrium 
continues to obtain.8 
Without reentry, linking the  contests  does  not  stiffen the  incumbent's backbone, 
regardless of  qo and N.  Contrast this with the previous section, where for small qo the 
incumbent's reputation dominates play for large N.  There, increasing N  increases the 
(opportunity) cost of concession,  but does not change the (momentary) cost of fighting. 
Here, both costs increase at the same rate.  For the incumbent's reputation to dominate 
with simultaneous play, the cost of concession  must (be able to) rise more quickly than 
does the number of entrants. 
It is helpful to interpret this result using the "strategic backbone/strategic flexibility" 
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loss of strategic flexibility.  That is, strategic flexibility is lost if one, for strategic reasons, 
would wish to treat a given opponent  differently if others are watching from how that 
opponent  would  be  treated if  others could  not  observe.  This translates to  a gain  in 
strategic backbone if this change in one's strategic reactions has salubrious effect on the 
initiating actions of  others.  Of course, to  wish to treat one  opponent  differently from 
others, it is necessary that this opponent be somehow distinguished from the others.  But 
in the no reentry scenario and the equilibrium we have constructed, entrants are distin- 
guished only insofar as some  have conceded  and others have not.  All those that have 
not conceded are identical.  Since, without reentry, the incumbent need not be concerned 
with entrants that have already conceded,  there is no loss in strategic flexibility.  Hence 
there can be no gain in strategic backbone. 
Imagine, however, that the game began with entrants that were tough with different 
probabilities.  In particular, consider the case of two entrants, one  of  whom is almost 
sure to be strong, and the other is almost certainly weak. Without linkage, the incumbent 
would net almost a against the "weak" entrant and zero against the "strong" entrant, or 
a  in total.  It should  not be  surprising that the incumbent does  not do  as well  under 
conditions of informational linkage, because it cannot afford to concede to the "strong" 
entrant until it has obtained concession  from the weak.  On the other hand, we believe, 
but have not shown, that if the parameters a  and  b, as well  as the prior, vary across 
contests, then the incumbent could gain by linkage.9 
5.  SIMULTANEOUS  CONTESTS  WITH  REENTRY 
5.1.  Two models 
In the sequential contests model we observed a loss of strategic flexibility, even though 
priors were equal, because  in the course of play the incumbent could  come to believe 
that its current opponent was more likely to be tough than are its future opponents.  With 
simultaneous play, it is likewise the case that identical priors become unequal posteriors; 
viz., some entrants concede  while the others fight.  Without reentry this doesn't matter, 
because the incumbent needn't be concerned with entrants that have already conceded. 
But if entrants that have conceded can reenter, we can anticipate that the loss of strategic 
flexibility may be consequential,  and that there may therefore be a gain from stiffened 
strategic backbone. 
To  investigate this,  we  consider  here two  variations on  simultaneous  play  "with 
reentry".  In both, if the  (weak)  incumbent ever concedes,  then it nets a zero flow of 
benefits for the remainder of the game.  That is, the incumbent loses the flow of benefits 
accruing from contests already won.  The variations are distinguished in what happens 
to  entrants that conceded  prior to  the  incumbent's concession.  In the  first variation, 
called (hereafter) reentry scenario A, all entrants receive reward at a rate of  b per unit 
time after the incumbent concedes, regardless of whether those entrants conceded earlier 
or not.  In reentry  scenario B, only entrants that have not already conceded  receive this 
positive flow of reward. The description reentry  is, therefore, more descriptive of scenario 
A than it is of B; the reason for introducing scenario B will become clear as we proceed. 
The remainder of this section  is organized as follows.  In the next subsection,  we 
analyse the equilibrium for two entrants and for a > 1, both to provide a warm-up for 
the general case and to illustrate the tension between gain in strategic backbone and loss 
of strategic flexibility.  In Subsection 5.3, we present the equilibrium for general values 
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but we have not obtained closed  form solution.  Finally, in Subsection 5.4, we present 
analysis of the limiting form of the equilibria in 5.3, for large N, under the assumptions 
of scenario B.  A summary of the results of Subsection 5.4 are that for any p0 E (0,. 1), if 
q0> a/(a  + 1),  then  the  incumbent  (if  weak)  concedes  at the  outset  with  probability 
approaching one (Proposition 4), while for q?< a/(a  + 1), all weak incumbents concede 
at the  outset  with  probability  approaching  one  (Proposition  5).  These  results,  once 
established, show that the  (weak)  incumbent's asymptotic expected  payoff per contest 
under scenario B is precisely as in the case of opponents faced sequentially, and Proposition 
3  applies  to  simultaneous  contests  under  scenario  B,  precisely  as  stated  before  for 
sequential contests. 
5.2.  The case N = 2 and a > 1 
Consider the case of two entrants and a > 1.  If either of the two entrants concedes, then 
the (weak) incumbent's flow of payoffs is a -1  > 0 if the second entrant does not concede. 
Hence the concession of the first  entrant ensures  that the incumbent will never subsequently 
concede;  fighting to the end dominates concession,  no matter what the second entrant 
does.  This in turn implies that if one entrant does concede and the remaining entrant is 
weak, the  remaining entrant, knowing that the  incumbent will  now  fight to  the  end, 
concedes immediately thereafter. 
Accordingly, we derive an equilibrium of the following  form.  As in the case of  a 
single entrant, we have a curve q =f(p)  that runs between (0, 0) and (1, 1), such that if 
there has been no concession  yet, if the incumbent is strong with some probability p, 
and if each entrant is strong with probability q, =f(p,),  independent of each other and 
of the strength of the incumbent, then all the (weak) players have expected payoffs for 
the rest of the game of zero.  Each adopts a strategy of continuous randomization, the 
(weak)  incumbent dropping with hazard rate  7r, and each entrant (if  weak) dropping 
independently with hazard rate p, such that posteriors computed by Bayes' rule move up 
along the curve (p,f(p)).  Before time zero is reached, either some player has conceded 
(which effectively ends the game), or it is known that all players are strong; that is, the 
posteriors (1, 1) are reached. 
If, at the start of the game, (p0, qo) is above the curve, then the (weak) incumbent 
randomizes between immediate concession and beginning to fight, such that no immediate 
concession  causes the entrants to reassess the probability that the incumbent is strong to 
be f -(q0).  And if (p?, qo) lies below the curve, then the game starts with (independent) 
randomizations by the entrants (if weak) between concession  and fighting such that, if 
they choose to fight, the probability that they are strong rises to f(p?).  Note that, in this 
second case, it is possible that each entrant is weak, and that after conducting these initial 
randomizations, one chooses to fight and the other chooses to concede.  Then, since one 
entrant has conceded,  the incumbent is sure never to concede,  and the second  entrant 
(because it is weak) concedes  immediately.  That is, a concession  by one entrant at the 
start increases the chances of a concession  by the second,  although their strategies are 
chosen independently.  This is a manifestation of continuous time, where we are imagining 
that one player can react instantaneously to the actions of second; the phenomenon  is 
just as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).1o 
To specify the equilibrium, it remains to give  7r and p, which will also identify the 
curve q =f(p).  Analysis just as in Section 4 is employed.  Each entrant, while employing 
a continuous randomization strategy p, must be indifferent between immediate concession 
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units is (with probability very close to one)  -h.  There is probability (1 -p,)rh  that the 
incumbent will  concede,  which  will  confer  a  benefit  of  bt.  And  there  is  probability 
(1 -  q,)ph that the other entrant will concede; should this occur, the first entrant (if weak) 
will concede immediately, for a zero continuation value.  Since immediate concession by 
this entrant means that the incumbent will never concede,  concession  either at t or t -  h 
means  a  continuation  value  of  zero  (in  either  scenario  A  or  B),  and  the  entrant's 
indifference equation, which yields  7r,  is 
0 = -1  + (1 -pt)rbt.  (5.1a) 
For the incumbent's indifference relation, note first that if each entrant (if weak) is 
conceding at rate p independently of the other, and each is weak with probability 1 -  q, 
independently of the other, then the rate of the "next" concession  by an entrant is the 
sum of the individual rates, or 2(1 -  q,)p.  Thus we have the indifference equation 
0 = -2+2(1  -  q,)p(a + a(l  -  qt) -  qt)t.  (5.1b) 
The terms on the right hand side are the cost of fighting (divided by h) -2,  and then the 
rate of  the  next  concession  2(1 -  qt)p  by  an  entrant times  the  expected  gain  to  the 
incumbent if one of the two concedes,  (a + a (1 -  qt) -  qt)  t. This last term is the gain at 
from the one entrant who does concede, plus the expected gain (a(1 -  qt) -  qt)t from the 
second entrant. 
Equations (5.1) are substituted into Bayes' rule (3.2) and integrated with the boundary 
condition  that the  curve  q =f(p)  passes  through  (1, 1).  This gives  the  curve, with p 
written as a function of q, 
p  q2a/be(1+a)(1-q)/b 
In Figure 4 we graph this curve together with the curve for a single  entrant, p = qalb 
The reader can easily verify that the picture is as we have shown, with the curve for two 
entrants lying below the curve for one for high values of q, and lying above for low values 
of q. 
We can see in this picture the tension  between the two sides of the informational 
linkage of the two contests, the beneficial stiffened strategic backbone and the costly loss 
in strategic flexibility. For low values of q, gains from stiffened strategic backbone exceed 
losses from the loss of strategic flexibility, because if one entrant can be made to concede, 
it is likely that the stiffened strategic backbone will cause the other to concede.  For high 
values of q, if one entrant concedes there are good prospects that the other will have to 
be fought to protect the gains already won,  so the losses  from lost strategic flexibility 
outweigh the gains from stiffened backbone. 
We should note that a comparison of informational linkage vs. informational isolation 
in this case is not entirely trivial.  If (p?, qo) lies above both curves in Figure 4, then the 
(weak) incumbent nets zero in either case.  If the initial data lie in the vertically cross- 
hatched region, linkage gives the incumbent a positive expected payoff, while isolation 
gives expected payoff zero in each contest, so that linkage is clearly preferred. Similarly, 
it is clear that isolation is preferred in the horizontally cross-hatched region.  But in the 
region below both curves, where the (weak) incumbent has a positive expected payoff in 
either regime, the exact computations must be carried out.  We will spare the reader the 
details and simply make the assertion that at points (p?, qo) below both curves, and where 
po is at or below  the level  at which the two  curves intersect, informational linkage is 
preferred. But for p0 above the intersection level, there are points (p?, qo) below both at 
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FIGURE  4 
The equilibrium for the case N = 2 and a > 1. 
5.3.  Construction  of an equilibrium  for the general case 
The equilibrium of this game for the general case has a relatively simple form, but it is 
quite difficult to compute precisely.  We will begin by giving the form of the equilibrium, 
and then we will show how, inductively, one would compute it. 
Let  K  be  the  smallest  integer  such  that  (N-K)a-K'-O  and  (N-K-l)a- 
(K+1)<O.  That is, K =  [Na/(a+1)j,  where  [  J denotes "integer part of".  Note that 
K =  0 is  possible.  To  keep  matters  simple,  we  will  assume  that  (N  -  K)a  -  K >0. 
Description-of  the equilibrium. In either scenario A or B, the game has an equilibrium 
of  the  following  form.  (Refer  to  Figure  5.)  For  each  k =  K+,  . . .,  N,  there  is  a 
corresponding curve in the unit square state space, passing through (0, 0) and (1, 1), with 
the curve for k lying above the curve for k+ 1. 
1 
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FIGURE  5 
State space of the game with simultaneous contests and no reentry. 556  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
(i)  At every time  in the  game, there is  identical  probability that any entrant is 
strong, and the strengths of different entrants are independent  and independent  of the 
strength of the incumbent.  We denote the (common) probability that an entrant is strong 
by q,  and the probability that the incumbent is strong by p,. 
(ii)  If the initial datum (p?, qo) lies above and to the left of the N  curve, then the 
game begins with an immediate randomization by the weak incumbent between concession 
and beginning to play, such that, conditional on no concession,  the probability that the 
incumbent is strong rises to take us to the N  curve. 
(iii)  If at any time in the game (including the start), there are k>  K  entrants that 
have not previously conceded,  and if (pt, q,) lies below and to the right of the k curve, 
then those of the k "remaining" entrants that are weak randomize independently between 
immediate concession and continuing to play, so that (for each) the posterior probability 
of strength given no concession  moves to the k curve.  Note  well that if we begin with, 
say, k entrants, and all randomize, there is positive probability that some number j < k 
will continue to fight and k -j  will concede immediately.  If j > K, then we will again be 
at a point below the relevant curve (now the j  curve), and a subsequent randomization 
between immediate concession  and continuing to fight will be required. This "cascade" 
of instantaneous randomizations ends in one of two ways: either there are some number 
k'>  K  of entrants remaining, and the posterior probability of their strength is such that 
(Pt, q,) lies along the k' curve; or there are K  or fewer entrants remaining. 
(iv)  If at any time in the game there are K  or fewer entrants remaining, then the 
incumbent, strong or weak, will fight to the end with probability one.  Accordingly, of 
the remaining entrants, all that are weak will concede  immediately. 
(v)  If at any time in the game there are k > K  entrants remaining, and the state of 
the game lies along the k curve, then the entrants and incumbent concede  with hazard 
rates that cause the state of the game to move along the k curve.  This behaviour ends 
one of three ways: the point  (1, 1) is reached (which will happen before time runs out 
in the game).  The incumbent concedes,  in which case the game is over.  One entrant 
concedes,  in which case,  as we are below  the  k-  1 curve, the prescription of step (iii) 
above is followed. 
The equilibrium described has as basis the following  consideration: if ever N -  K 
or more of the entrants have conceded, then the weak incumbent will never concede; the 
positive flow from the N -  K  contests won is enough to cover the cost of fighting the K 
contests remaining, even if none of the K remaining ever concede.  (In terms of the case 
N = 2 and a > 1, K  is one-as  soon as the first entrant concedes, the incumbent is sure 
to fight for the rest of the game.)  Hence, at any point at which the incumbent faces K 
or fewer live entrants, all the remaining entrants that are weak will concede immediately. 
It is the prospect of such an event that keeps the incumbent fighting, and (in equilibrium) 
the incumbent's instantaneous cost of fighting must just be covered by the instantaneous 
expected value composed of the chance that such an event will occur times the value the 
incumbent will receive for the remainder of the game if the event occurs.  The concession 
rates of  live entrants are adjusted in equilibrium so that this equation holds.  And the 
concession  rate of the incumbent is set so  that live entrants are just  compensated  for 
fighting by the (instantaneous) chance that the incumbent will concede.  Equations similar 
in spirit to (3.1) (and (5.1)) govern concession  rates, and hence generate the curves that 
describe the equilibrium. 
The exact equations that replace (3.1) are a good deal more complex than (3.1), on 
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entrants alive, each conceding with hazard rate p.  If the incumbent concedes, it will net 
zero for the remainder of the game, hence the left hand side of the replacement for (3.1a) 
remains zero. The instantaneous cost of fighting is k. The rate at which the next concession 
takes place is (1 -  q,)kp.  But, whereas in (3.1a)  (and in (4.1)) the next concession  nets 
at  for the  incumbent, here it does  not.  The expression  for the  incumbent's expected 
value, given this initial concession, is a monster: the k -I  remaining entrants all randomize 
immediately, with concession  probability that would carry the posterior up to the k -  1 
curve  (whose  placement  is  derived  in  the  previous  step  of  a  recursive derivation). 
Conditional  on the number of  the  k -  1 entrants that do  not concede  (unless  it is  all 
k -  1), we now have another immediate randomization to carry posteriors up to a curve 
of still lower index,  etc.  Working through all these, we get a marginal distribution for 
(i)  the probability that this cascade of randomizations ends on a j  curve for K <j  < k 
with j entrants still live, in which case the incumbent nets expectation zero in continuation, 
and (ii) the probability that it ends with j_  K  live entrants.  If it ends with j-'  K  live 
entrants (the others all strong with some probability q* that depends in a nontrivial way 
on j),  the incumbent nets an expected reward of  t[a((K  -j)  +j(l  -  q*)) -jq*].  (This is 
at from each of the K -j  already dead entrants, plus at from the each of j  remaining 
that concede immediately, less - t from each of the j remaining that turn out to be strong.) 
If we have the placement of the j  curves for all j < k, then this expected gain is certainly 
computable, step by step.  But it seems rather formidable analytically. 
*  As for the analogue to (3.1b), the distinction between scenarios A and B becomes 
important.  Scenario B is the easier to deal with.  If an entrant concedes,  it will net zero 
for the remainder of the game.  Hence the left hand side of the analogue to (3.lb)  is zero. 
The instantaneous cost of fighting is -1,  as in (3.1b).  And the instantaneous expected 
gain arises from the chance that the incumbent concedes,  which occurs at rate (1 -p,)  71 
and nets bt for the entrant.  (If some other entrant concedes,  either the game continues 
along some other j curve, along which the entrant nets zero expected value.  Or the game 
ends with a cascade leading to  K  or fewer entrants, which will mean a payoff of zero 
for a (weak) entrant.)  Hence, in scenario B, Xr is given by precisely (3.1b). 
In scenario A, things are more complex.  Note that a weak entrant who has conceded 
does not necessarily have zero expected payoff for the remainder of the game.  If there 
are more than K  entrants left, there is a chance the incumbent will concede,  and then 
the entrants that conceded  earlier can reenter to  accrue a positive  reward.  Hence the 
value of immediate concession, which goes on the left hand side of the analogue to (3.lb), 
is no longer zero.  Rather, it is the solution of an integral equation.  The right hand side 
of the entrant's indifference equation will include instantaneous cost (incurred at rate 1) 
and the gain bt times the probability that the incumbent concedes,  as before.  But also, 
at rate (k -  1)(1 -  q,)p, some other entrant might concede,  and this will effect the value 
to the weak entrant whose payoffs we are attempting to balance.  The exact impact will 
depend, as before, on the distribution of the outcome of the cascade of randomizations 
let loose  by any concession  (although now we must condition  that distribution on the 
knowledge  of  the  one  entrant that it,  at  least,  is  indeed  weak)  and  on  the  value  of 
continuation to a weak entrant for each of those outcomes.  Finally, since this is meant 
to evaluate the expected  value to an entrant of  conceding  after h more time units, we 
must compute that (no  longer zero) expected  value, which involves  yet another set of 
probabilities of how the next cascade will resolve.  Once again, the curves are computable 
in theory (although now they are integral instead of differential equations). 
One sees from the description how to prove that an equilibrium of the form given 
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the curves for j < k already in place.  The important step in the recursion is to show that 
the k curve lies below the k -1  curve.  To see that this is so, note that in the analogue 
to  (3.la),  as the  k curve comes  closer to the  k-  1 curve, the probability that all  k-  1 
entrants continue to fight after an initial concession goes to one.  Hence the "gain" term 
for the weak incumbent goes  to zero.  To achieve equality in the analogue to  (3.1a),  p 
must increase, which increases the slope of the k curve, pushing it away from (and below) 
the  k -1  curve.  (The exact  argument is  a bit more complex  in  scenario A,  owing  to 
changes in the analogue to (3.1b), but we will not go into details.)  An equilibrium exists 
that does have the form given, and, with a large computer budget, one could solve  (to 
any desired level of accuracy) for the position of the curves. 
5.4.  Asymptotic results 
While we are unable to obtain a closed form solution for the equilibrium, we are able, 
in scenario B at least, to obtain asymptotic results for large N.  As in the literature on 
sequential  contests, the  comparison of  qo and  a/(a+  1)  is the key.  Let us point  out, 
however, that here the asymptotics do not follow from the general argument of Fudenberg 
and Levine (1987), as no matter how many entrants are involved, the incumbent and the 
entrants have the same decision horizon.  That is, the reputation of each will be of value 
for the same length of time.  Of course, the incumbent's reputation is of value against 
more opponent.s, but we know from the no reentry case that this fact alone is not decisive. 
What matters is, of course, the comparison of costs and benefits of the reputation. 
Throughout this section, we let KN denote  [aN/(a+  I)],  and we will assume that 
a is irrational, so that aN/(a  + 1) is never itself integer. 
Proposition 4.  In scenario B, if q?> a/(a+  1),  then as N -- oo  the incumbent  begins 
the game by conceding with probability  approaching  one. 
Proof  The idea of the proof is that, for q?> a/(a  + 1), as N  goes to infinity there 
is vanishingly small probability that more than N -  KN entrants will ever concede, because 
there is vanishingly small probability that more than N -  KN  entrants are in fact weak. 
Thus there is vanishingly small chance that the incumbent will ever get a net positive 
flow of reward (in fact, we will show that the expected reward vanishes with N),  so the 
incumbent will only fight for a very small period of time.  But since, in scenario B, the 
amount of time the incumbent must be willing to fight is the time it takes p, to reach one, 
and the equation for the evolution  of p, is independent  of  N, it must be that Pi (after 
initial randomizations) is, in the limit, one.  For any fixed p?, this gives the result of the 
proposition. 
A  bit  more formally,  note  that in  the  equilibrium, it  is  a  best  response  for  the 
incumbent to refuse to concede until such time as (pt, q,) reaches (1, 1) (where, of course, 
the incumbent does not concede if, before this time, N -  KN or more entrants do in fact 
concede).  The time TN at which p, reaches 1 in the game with N  entrants depends on 
the probability p1N  that the incumbent is strong after any initial randomizations and the 
differential equation fi  = p/ bt. In particular, this time approaches 1 (that is, the amount 
of time that elapses until (1, 1) is reached approaches zero) in N  if and only if P1N  goes 
to 1.  So we aim to show that TN must approach one as N -> oo. 
In the game with N  entrants, if the incumbent waits until time TN, then the chance 
that the incumbent "wins" before time TN is precisely the probability that there are KN 
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incumbent will, by waiting until TN, lose at least (a+  1)(1 -  rN)  (and, probably, a good 
deal  more).  If there are precisely  KN  strong entrants, the  incumbent will  lose  some 
amount. And if there are KN or fewer strong entrants, then aN  is the most the incumbent 
can hope to win.  Thus, by following the "don't concede until TN" strategy, the ex ante 
expected payoff to the incumbent is bounded above by: 
Prob (KN or fewer entrants are strong) x aN 
-  Prob (more than KN  + 1 strong entrants) x (a + 1)(1 -  'rN)- 
From  Feller  (1968,  VII.  6),  the  first probability  goes  to  zero  at  a  rate  exceeding 
exp (-N114)/N116  and the second probability goes to one.  (The estimate given is fairly 
crude.)  Hence for the expected value to be nonnegative, it must be that TN  -  1, which 
completes the proof.  11 
Proposition  5.  In scenario B, if qo < a/(a  +1),  then as N approaches oo, N -  KN or 
more  entrants  concede  at the outset (and the incumbent  "wins") with  probability  approaching 
one. 
Proof  We  will  not  give  all  the  details,  although  the  reader should  be  able  to 
reconstruct them  from  the  following  sketch.  To  begin,  establish  some  notation  and 
terminology.  Let 
A  (aq  +  1)  2. 
By assumption, A is less than one.  Imagine that the incumbent, if weak, plays the strategy 
of no concession  until such time as posteriors (1, 1) are reached.  Note that this happens 
at some time  t*>  0, which  can be bounded  below  by integrating the equation for the 
evolution of p, with the initial condition Pi = po.  (It is at this point only that we use the 
assumption that scenario  B  pertains; to  ensure that the law of  motion  of p, does  not 
change with N.  Note that if the game begins with a randomization by the incumbent, Pi 
will exceed p?, and t* will be larger.) 
Imagine this incumbent watching the game evolve as he plays this particular waiting 
strategy (which, we note, is among his best responses).  Let K(t) be the stochastic process 
that gives the number of remaining entrants at time t, and let +(t)  denote the (common) 
posterior probability that the remaining entrants are strong.  For definiteness, we fix the 
right continuous versions of these stochastic processes: K (t) gives the number of remaining 
entrants after any cascade of randomizations at time t, etc.  We will use K(t-)  and  b(F) 
to  denote  the  left continuous  versions.  Let S(t)  and  S(t)  be  equal to  K(t)+(t)  and 
K(t)4(t-),  respectively.  That  is,  S(t)  is the  expected  number  of  strong  entrants  given 
the information revealed up to (and including) time t. 
Now  consider two stopping times.  The first is the first time (if it occurs) that there 
are KN  or fewer entrants remaining-the  first hitting time of  {K(t)  KN}.  The second 
is the first time that  b(t)K(t)/N?-Aa/(a+  1).  Note  that, for large N.  one  of  rl or T2 
must occur prior to t*.  The first stopping time marks a time at which the incumbent has 
"won".  The second marks a time at which the remaining entrants are surprisingly strong. 
The meaning of the second description arises from the following  result: 
As N -> oo, the  probability  that  rl  occurs  before  T2 approaches  one. 
We leave the proof for later, but the intuition should be clear. Given the prior probability 
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must have expected value qo.  Moreover, for large N, there can be little variance in its 
value.  So the probability that S(t)/N  exceeds Aa/(a  +1)  must approach zero as N ->  oo. 
Now suppose that at some time t, the incumbent "wins"; that is, the time ir1 is reached 
(before  r2).  We claim that the expected number of strong entrants, conditional  on this 
event, is bounded  above by S(t-).  To see this, note that S(t-)  is the expected number 
of strong entrants just before time t. The probability of enough concessions  at time t to 
cause the "win" (given that at time t one of the K(t-)  did concede),  conditional on the 
number of actually strong entrants, is decreasing in the number of strong entrants. Hence 
the expected number of strong entrants, conditional  on a win at time  t, is less than the 
unconditional expectation S(t-).  Thus the conditional expected value to the incumbent, 
conditional  on  a win at time  t and conditional  on  K(t-)  and  b(F),  is at least (aN- 
(a+1)S(t-))t*.  Since  r2 was not hit before time t, S(t)/N<Aa/(a+  1), and we have a 
lower bound on this conditional  expected value of aN(1 -A)t*. 
At time  t, before the times  r1 and  r2,  the maximal rate of cost to the incumbent is 
N.  Until  these  two  stopping  times,  in  our  equilibrium the  instantaneous  cost  to  the 
incumbent must just  equal the  hazard rate at which the incumbent "wins" times the 
conditional expected value it receives if it does win.  So we see that the hazard rate of a 
win for the incumbent at times before  rl and  T2  is bounded above, uniformly in N, by 
1/(a(l  -  A)t*).  But then by integrating the hazard rate, we see that, over the time interval 
from time one to time t*,  the chance of a "no win" (that rl is delayed until after 12)  is 
bounded below by 
Prob (no win at outset) x e-(1-t*)1(a(1-A)t*' 
If we know the probability of "no win before  T2"  must go to zero in N, then probability 
of a win at the outset must go to one. 
To complete the proof, it remains to establish that the probability that ir- is less than 
T2  goes to one as N-> oo.  To show this, note that the maximum of  rl and  r2 is a stopping 
time,  and  that  S(t)/N  is  a  bounded  martingale, so  that  E(S(ir)/N)=  q0, where  r= 
max(T1, T2).  "  Fix any e > 0, and let 
a  q  4/ 
Select N  sufficiently large that 
Prob (fraction of strong entrants < qo  -  <8. 
(That sufficiently large N  do exist follows  from the estimate given in the proof of the 
previous proposition.)  Now  decompose  E(S(Qr)/N)  into three pieces: the integral over 
the set A1 where  72>  Tr;  the integral over the set A2 where  Tj >  T2  and the fraction of 
strong entrants is q?- 8  or less; and integral over the set A3 where ri>  T2 and the fraction 
of strong entrants is above q?-  -.  The integral over A1  is bounded below by the probability 
of A1  times (q?+ a/(a  + 1))/2,  from the definition of A1. The integral over A2 is nonnega- 
tive.  And the integral over A3 is bounded below by q?- 8  times its probability.  Hence 
E(S(Qr)/N)  is bounded below by 
Prob(Al)x(q  +?a1)j2+Prob(A3)x(qo  -8) 
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-q -Oq?  xProb(A2)-8?Prob(Al)(aq?)  /2 
/  a  ~  a+ 
q?-28+Prob(Aj)  +-q)2. 
By the definition of 8, then, the original integral can equal qo only if the probability of 
Al is less than E, which completes the proof.  11 
Although it takes a bit more work, the methods used to prove Propositions 4 and 5 
can be used to describe the location of the k curves (k > KN)  for large N.  Fixing p E (0,  1), 
for a _ a/(a  + 1), the q level of the jaNj  curve at p (in the N  entrant game) approaches 
a/(a  (a + 1)).  That is, the picture is as in Figure 6. 
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FIGURE  6 
Position  of the [aNJ curve  for large N and a X [a/(a + 1), 1]. 
In both propositions,  we needed to assume that scenario B prevailed.  In the first 
proposition, we needed to know that the motion of p, does not become very quick (from 
any given starting point) in N;  that if Pt has to reach 1 in a short period of time, then it 
would have to begin at a value close to 1.  In the second proposition, we needed to know 
that the motion of Pt does not become very slow; that starting from p0 (or above), when 
the posterior 1 is reached, there is still some amount of time (bounded below in N)  left 
in the game.  So it seems clear that one of the two propositions must hold in scenario A. 
Intuition would  suggest that the incumbent is  better off in  scenario  A  than in  B.  In 
scenario A, entrants face a "free rider" problem in that it is better for any single entrant 
to sit on the sidelines and let the other entrants fight the incumbent than to fight itself. 
If the incumbent does concede, an entrant on the sidelines gets all the benefits (in scenario 
A) that accrue to one who fought.  If this intuition is correct, then Proposition 5 would 
be the one more likely to survive in scenario A. 562  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
In fact, we believe that both propositions do in fact survive in scenario A.  An earlier 
version of this paper (available upon request) shows that this is so at the "limit" game, 
in which the incumbent faces a continuum of entrants.  But scenario  B  is sufficient to 
make the point that we wish to make, namely that with simultaneous play, one must look 
closely  at the  structure of  the  game  to  see  if  the  reputation effect of  the  incumbent 
dominates.  We leave further analysis to the interested reader. 
APPENDIX:  SEQUENTIAL  PLAY OF  THE  CONCESSION  GAME 
In this appendix, we analyze sequential play of the concession  game, as outlined at the end of Section 3.  In 
particular, we provide a proof of Proposition 2. This is done for a particular equilibrium, which we will construct 
along the way.  (We do not know that this is the only sequential equilibrium of this game, although we believe 
that it is.)  We use the following notation: the expected value to the weak incumbent from equilibrium play in 
contests n, n -  1, . . .1,  if contest n begins with the entrants assessing that the incumbent is strong with probability 
p is denoted by v,,  (p).  (Recall that contests are indexed backwards, so that contest 1 is the last.) The probability 
qo enters as a parameter to this function and is held fixed throughout.  We will prove the following strengthened 
version of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2'. 
(a)  In the equilibrium  to this game, vn(p)  is nondecreasing in p. 
(b)  If qo> a/(a  + 1) then v,(p)  < a(1 -  q?)/lq<  1, and the long run expected  value percontest to the (weak) 
incumbent  approaches zero.  There is a constant k( p?) (independent of N)  such that the incumbent, if weak, will 
fight for a total length of time that is bounded above by k(p?).  Hence the probability  that the incumbent  (if weak) 
has not conceded by the end of round N  -  m decays exponentially in m. 
(c)  If qo  <  a/(a  + 1), then there is a number  n  (p?)  such that in all contests against entrants of index greater 
than n  (p?),  the incumbent (weak or strong)  will fight for  the full  unit time with certainty. Accordingly, weak 
entrants in those contests concede immediately. And  limN-,  VN(p)N  =  a(1 -  qo) -  qo (for all p?> 0). 
The equilibrium 
The first step is to give the equilibrium construction.  Recall that the incumbent, if strong, will always fight, 
and strong entrants always enter.  Hence we will describe only the equilibrium strategies of the weak incumbent 
and weak entrants.  Throughout, qo, the prior probability (at the beginning  of  each  stage)  that the  current 
entrant is strong, is treated as a parameter and is suppressed in the notation.  We use  v,1(p) to  denote  the 
expected payoff to the weak incumbent for play of the game from stage n to stage 1, inclusive, when stage n 
begins with the entrants assessing probability p that the incumbent is strong. 
The equilibrium takes the following  form at stage n: 
(0)  If, at any point in the game, the incumbent concedes,  whether in equilibrium or out, entrants revise 
assessments that the incumbent is strong to be zero.  Thereafter, the incumbent concedes  immediately in all 
contests, and entrants never concede. 
(i)  If  v,1_-(p)?  1, then  the  (weak)  incumbent will  refuse to  concede  in  the  current round,  even  if 
convinced that the current entrant is strong.  Hence weak entrants will concede at the outset of this round.  It 
is immediate in this case that v,,(p) = a - (a +  1)q?+  v,1-I(p). 
(ii)  If v,1(  -  p) < 1, then there is a curve analogous to the curve q = ph/a along which play evolves in this 
stage, after initial randomization by one side or the other which takes us to the curve.  The placement of this 
curve depends on  n and on p.  It is given by indifference equations analogous to (4.1), which in this case are 
1 =  (1 -p,)lTbt  and  1 =  (1 -q,)p(at+  v,1_,(p,)),  (A.1) 
where t in these  equations refers to  the time remaining in the current stage.  These  indifference equations, 
together with Bayes's rule (4.2), give differential equations 
p  _  _  q  p=-  and  q4=  qA2 
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for the evolution of the posteriors in the current stage.  The boundary condition  for this curve (analogous to 
the condition in the single contest game that the curve passes through (1, 1) is: at the time t* (in the current 
stage) at which q,*  = 1 (the entrant is certain to be strong), the value to the incumbent beginning the next stage 
must satisfy the inequality 
v,1_  p,*)  _ t~.  (A.3) 
If (A.3)  holds  as a strict inequality, then the boundary condition  is that p,* = 1, and the weak incumbent's 
strategy has called for him to concede  with probability one by this point.  If (A.3) holds as an equality, then 
p,*  < 1 is possible,  and the weak incumbent's strategy calls for him to refuse to concede  for the remainder of 
the current stage. 
We establish that an equilibrium of this form exists by induction on n, the number of stages remaining 
in the game.  We will show, as we proceed, that the boundary condition given in (ii) is uniquely specified as 
we compute  v,, recursively.  As part of the induction hypothesis,  we establish that each  v,, has the following 
properties: 
(iii)  v,, is nonnegative, has value zero at p = 0, is nondecreasing and strictly increasing when it is nonzero, 
and it is continuous. 
Initiating the induction.  As the first stage in our inductive proof,  we note that v,,  the value function 
associated with the equilibrium for a single stage of the game given in Section 3, has all the properties given 
in (iii).  Thinking of vo as being identically zero, we see as well that the equilibrium for this last stage is described 
by (ii).  This initiates the induction. 
If  the incumbent ever concedes.  We note  next that  (0)  above  is  indeed  compatible  with  (sequential) 
equilibrium. As long as entrants will never again concede, the weak incumbent wishes to concede immediately 
in  all  cases.  Entrants, expecting  the  incumbent to  concede  immediately  with  probability  one  (and  being 
unshakeable in this belief)  will never concede.  Note  that this shows that v,,  (0)  is indeed zero.  Also,  since a 
strong incumbent will never concede,  the beliefs entailed in (0) are consistent with any equilibrium strategies 
for this game. 
Beginning with  vn-1  (p)  1.  Suppose the properties above have been established for all j_  n -  1. Consider 
play beginning at the start of stage n, with initial probability p" that the incumbent is strong.  If v,,_,(p`)  '  1, 
then play as described in step (i) is certainly equilibrium play.  If the incumbent will not concede at all in this 
stage, then weak entrants concede  immediately.  If weak entrants concede  immediately, then the incumbent 
will be certain, if there is no concession, that the current entrant is strong, and hence the current stage will cost 
1.  Given (0), if the weak entrant does concede, then p will move to zero, and the incumbent will then net the 
continuation value vn_-(0) = 0.  Hence it is an equilibrium for the weak incumbent to pay the cost of 1 and get 
in return the continuation value vn_-(p`)- 
(Indeed, this is the only possible path of equilibrium play at this stage, given that v,,_, gives the continuation 
value.  If in some equilibrium the weak incumbent were to concede with positive probability, then Bayes' rule 
would force beliefs  given concession  to zero, giving zero continuation value next period.  Since fighting will 
lead to a p`l  beginning the next stage which is no lower than the current value p", and since v,,_  is (by the 
induction hypothesis)  strictly increasing above p"  (and, hence,  is strictly greater than one),  it cannot be an 
equilibrium for the weak incumbent to concede with positive probability.) 
This implies that v,(p")  =  a -  qo(a + 1) + v_,1 (p").  Thus v,, inherits all the properties of  v,,_, that are 
outlined in (iii) for p above the smallest value such that v,,(p) '  1. 
Beginning with v,,(p)  <  1-preliminaries.  The harder case is where we begin stage n with p" such that 
v,,-,(p')  < 1.  Note that, in such circumstances, the behaviour described in (i) is not equilibrium behaviour.  If 
the entrants play as in (i), then unless the entrant concedes immediately, the incumbent concludes that he faces 
a strong entrant, but the value of continuation if he follows  the equilibrium strategy and does not concede  is 
insufficient to compensate him for the cost of fighting to the end of the current period. 
We construct instead an equilibrium of  the form outlined  in (ii).  There is, as in Section  3, an initial 
randomization by one side or the other, such that if there is no initial concession,  then both sides (if weak) 
have continuation value zero for the rest of the game.  Each then concedes  continuously,  until such time as 
either one or the other concedes,  or until an appropriate boundary condition is reached.  We use, as before,  Xf 
to denote the concession (hazard) rate of the weak incumbent, and p to denote the concession rate of the weak 
entrant.  By the same sort of logic as in the one stage game,  Xf and p must satisfy the indifference equations 564  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
(A.1) given above.  The equation for  ir is just as before-the  weak entrant must just be compensated for the 
cost of fighting by the expected rate at which the incumbent will concede, times the prize won if the incumbent 
does  concede.  The equation  for p  has an additional  term, since  concession  by the  entrant gives the  weak 
incumbent at in the current contest and v,,_,(p,)  beginning the next.  Bayes' rule is as always, so in this regime 
of continuous randomizations, posteriors evolve according to the differential equations (A.2). 
v,,  (p) < 1-solutions  of  the differential equations and  the r function.  The next  step  is to  consider  the 
solution to the differential equations (A.2) as a function of initial conditions.  Refer to Figure Al.  We suppose 
that we start the current round at some point (pf,  q?), and that there may be an initial randomization by one 
(weak) side or the other, so the differential equations will be initiated at some point (Pi,  q,) with either pi  - p" 
and q, = qo or P, = p" and q, ?  qo.  That is, we begin the differential equations running at some point along 
one of the two rays emanating from (pnf,  q?) that are shown in Figure Al.  Given the assumptions about v,,1 
in the induction hypothesis, the solutions to the differential equations are well behaved in their initial conditions: 
(iv)  The solutions  to the differential equations  (A.2),  as functions of their initial conditions  along the 
rays shown in Figure Al,  are continuous in those initial conditions.  Paths from two different initial conditions 
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FIGURE  Al 
Solutions to the differential equations (A.2) for various starting and ending points. 
The equation for p, integrates to show that, since j-  p,  as long as pN  >0,  the level p, = 1 is reached 
by some time prior to time zero.  Hence from each of the possible initial conditions along the two rays, there 
is  a time  t*  depending  on  the  initial  conditions  at which  the  path of  (p,,  q,)  exists  from the  unit square. 
Moreover, because of  (iv), there is a continuous bijection between initial conditions  along the two rays and 
"terminal positions"  {(p, 1): p '  p"I}  u {(l,  q):  q '  qo} at which (p,, q,) departs the unit square. 
Accordingly,  there is some  particular initial condition  (p^,  q)  along  one  of  the two  rays such that the 
solution of  (A.2)  starting from that point passes out of the unit square at (1, 1).  Figure Al  is drawn so that 
(p^,  q)  lies to the right of (p',  qo); this need not be the case in general.  However the following is generally true. 
For every p'e  [po,  1], there is a unique starting position  (p(p'),  q(p'))  lying to the right and/or  above (p^,  q), 
along one  of  the two rays, such that with (p(p'),  q(p'))  as starting position,  the solution  to the differential 
equations exists the unit square at (p', 1).  These initial conditions are continuous in p'. FUDENBERG  &  KREPS  SIMULTANEOUS  OPPONENTS  565 
Let r(p') be the time remaining when the curve that exists at (p', 1), starting at (p(p'),  q(p')),  hits (p', 1). 
Being excessively  formal,  r(p')  is  such  that,  in the  solution  to  (A.2)  with  initial  condition  (p(p'),  q(p')), 
p,(p) -p'  and q,(P,)  =  1. (Note that p(p'),  q(p'), and  (p')  all depend on the initial point (p", q?), since (p", q?) 
determines the two rays that form the set of possible initial conditions.)  Now  we can show: 
(v)  For any initial point  (pf,  q?),  r(p')  is continuous  and strictly decreasing in  p'e  [p",  1].  Moreover, 
for fixed p',  T(p')  is nonincreasing in p", and it is strictly decreasing if p(p') = p". 
We leave to the reader the task of establishing (v), using the differential equations (A.2) and the assumed 
monotonicity (in p) of v,,1-.  Note that r(p")  =  1 and  T(l)  > 0. 
v,,,(p)  < 1-terminal  conditions and the equilibrium.  We can now  derive the terminal condition  that 
determines the equilibrium beginning at stage n with pn.  Refer to Figures A2(a) and A2(b).  We have graphed 
there T(p')  and v,,-1(p') for p'E [pn,  1].  Note that, by assumption,  vn_  ((p") <1  =  T(p").  Hence we either have 
a picture as in A2(a), in which the two curves intersect once and once only at some p'e  (p',  1], or we have the 
picture in A2(b), in which Vn-I  (1)  <  T(1).  The uniqueness and existence of an intersection point  (if  Vn-  (1)  _  Tr(1)) 
follows from the facts that both v,,1  and r are continuous,  r is strictly decreasing, and v,,1  is strictly increasing 
(where it is nonzero). 
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Finding the correct terminal condition for stage n 
(a)  In this case, the correct ending is (p*,  1), where p* is the solution of  T(p)=  V,,,(p). 
(b)  In this case, where T(1)  >  V,,  -I(1),  the correct ending point is (1, 1). 566  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Imagine that v_,-(1)  < r(1).  Then we use a terminal condition  for stage n the condition that the curve 
must pass through the point (1, 1).  At this point, by assumption, the value to the weak incumbent starting in 
the next stage is less than the cost the incumbent would  pay to wait for the next stage to begin  (since  the 
incumbent  now  knows  that the  current entrant is  strong with  probability one).  Accordingly,  if  the  weak 
incumbent waits until this posterior is reached, its optimal  continuation  is to concede  immediately, netting 
value zero.  This is the right terminal condition;  as in the single contest analysis, we can now integrate back 
from this terminal condition  to show that the weak incumbent's expected  payoff is zero all along the curve 
through (1, 1), hence  XT is a best response for the weak incumbent to its opponents' strategies. 
Now consider the case where the curves v,, , and r do intersect. We use in this case the terminal condition 
that the curve for stage n passes through the point  (p*,  1) where p*  is the point of  intersection of the two 
curves.  By construction, when the time r(p*)  is reached, the value of continuation beginning in the next stage 
is just equal to the cost the weak incumbent must incur to get to that stage.  Hence the value to the incumbent 
at this terminus is zero.  Once again, the incumbent's value all along the curve integrates back to be identically 
zero, and the incumbent is using a best response to its opponents' strategies. 
It is important that, in the second case, the incumbent does not concede at the time r(p*)  with positive 
probability-it  continues  on  to  the  next stage with probability one.  Of course,  after the  instant  r(p*)  the 
incumbent wishes  strictly to  remain, as the value beginning  the next stage is  undiminished,  while  the cost 
remaining to be paid to get to that stage decreases as time passes.  But at r(p*),  the incumbent is just indifferent. 
Still, if the incumbent were to  concede  with positive  probability at  r(p*),  then the weak entrant would,  by 
waiting until (just after) r(p*),  obtain a positive expected value, contradicting the optimality of the strategy 
specified by p. 
v,,_,I(p) < 1-completing  the induction  step.  We have now established that the equilibrium in stage n has 
the form we outlined.  To complete  the induction  (and finish the proof that there is an equilibrium of this 
form), we must show that vn inherits all the required properties. Continuity of v,, is tedious but straightforward: 
If p" moves a bit, so do the associated initial conditions p(p')  and q(p')  for each p', and (therefore) so does 
r(p').  The intersection point p* therefore moves a bit, which means that the initial condition at the intersection 
point q(p*)  moves continuously in pn,  and this initial condition continuously determines v,. 
Nonnegativity of vn is obvious.  It remains to show that v,, is strictly increasing in p" when it is nonzero. 
Fix, therefore, some p" such that v (p)  > 0, and consider v ( ")  for some p"  >  p'.  The argument was given 
for the case v,,  (p')  '  1.  So we may suppose that v_,  (p')  < 1.  Since vn  (p") > 0, we know from the form of 
the equilibrium that the appropriate starting condition for the corresponding curve is (p", q) for some q > qo, 
and the weak incumbent's expected payoff is v,,(p)  =  (1 -  qo/q)(a  + v,,(p")).  Consider two cases.  First, if 
V,1  I  (p")  :  1, then  v_,  (  n)  =  a -  (a + 1)q?+ v,1_,(p") - a + v,,1(f")  -  (a + v,,f,  p"))q?=  (1-  qo)(a  + v,l(  "')) > 
v,1(p").  The  other possibility  is  the  v,,(p^")  <  1, so  that  v,,(j$")  =  (1 -  q/q)(a  + v,,(")),  where  q is  the 
posterior appropriate to starting at (en,  qo).  By the monotonicity of  v,,_,,  we have the desired result as soon 
as we show that q  '  q. 
This follows  from the derivation of terminal conditions  in these cases: as noted before, the r curve for 
the starting value p =  p"  is (as a function of the terminating p') everywhere greater than the r curve for the 
starting value p =  p". Thus the equilibrating p* and the amount of time left r must both be greater starting in 
p^ than in p".  But if qc  < q, the argument used to prove (vi) above can be used to show that -r  will be less for 
(p^",  q) than for (p", q), a contradiction.  Thus we have an equilibrium of the form described. 
The equilibrium  for large N 
We next characterize the equilibrium for large N.  It is easiest to begin with the case q?> a/(a  + 1), for which 
the following  holds: 
(vi)  If q?>a/(a+  1), then v,,(p)'a(1-q?)/q?<  1, uniformly in p and n. Accordingly, the equilibrium 
behaviour is never of the form described in (i) but always has the form (ii).  There is an upper bound  k(p?) 
on the amount of time the incumbent (if weak) will fight, and (therefore) the probability that the incumbent 
(if weak) has not conceded by the end of round N -  m decays exponentially in m. 
We establish the uniform bound on vn by induction.  In the last stage, v,(p)  < a(1 -  qo) which is less than our 
bound.  Suppose that it has been shown that v,,  <a  (1 -  q?)/ q <  1, uniformly in p.  Then we know that the 
form of the equilibrium in stage n, regardless of p", has the form (ii),  and the expected  payoff to the weak 
incumbent is (1-  q/q)(a  + v,,_,(p"),  which is bounded above by (1-  q)(a  + a(1 -  q?)/q?) =  a(1 -  q?)/q?.  (An 
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(Indeed,  one can show that for any p < 1 this bound is not tight: limN  -  .  VN(P)  <  a(I -  q?)/q?.  This in 
turn implies that no matter how large is N, the probability that the incumbent, if weak, concedes  in the first 
contest is bounded away from zero.  We leave this to the reader.) 
To obtain the uniform bound on the total amount of time that the weak incumbent will fight, reason as 
follows.  If ever p reaches one, by that time the incumbent, if weak, must have conceded  with probability one. 
Hence we wish to show that p reaches one after the incumbent has fought for an amount of time that is bounded 
above (depending on po).  We can obtain such a bound from the law of motion of p, since any time p is moving, 
p-'  p/b.  The proof is complicated slightly by the fact that the weak incumbent may be fighting at times when 
p is not moving.  (Recall that when the state reaches the boundary q = 1, the incumbent does not concede  for 
the remainder of the contest.)  But in any contest in which the incumbent does fight at all, p must be moving 
for the first 1 -  a(I -  q?)/q? units of time; if the boundary was struck before that time, then the time remaining 
would exceed the continuation value, in contradiction to the nature of the equilibrium (unless p has already 
reached one).  So for every one  unit of time that the incumbent fights, p moves for 1 -  a(I -  q?)/q? or more. 
This, together with a bound on how long p can be moving before it strikes one, gives an upper bound on how 
long the (weak) incumbent will fight. 
Finally, the incumbent, if weak, will have to fight every strong entrant it meets, for the full unit of time 
(until it concedes).  Given an upper bound  k(p?)  on the amount of time the weak incumbent will fight, the 
chance that it will live beyond the first k(p?) + m contests is bounded above by the chance that in those first 
k(p?) + m contests,  m or more of the entrants faced are weak.  This clearly decays exponentially. 
Large N and q?< a/(a+  1).  When q?< a/(a  + 1), a very different picture emerges. 
(viii)  If qo  < a/(a  + 1), then there is a number n  (p?) such that in all contests of index greater than n  (p?), 
the  incumbent  (weak or strong) will  fight for the  full  unit of  time  with certainty.  That is, the  equilibrium 
behaviour  is  as  in  (i)  above.  Accordingly,  weak  entrants  in  those  contests  concede  immediately.  And 
limN,O  VN(p)/  N  = a -  (a + 1)qq. 
First recall from the  previous  step that we  can easily  bound  the total amount of  time that the  weak 
incumbent randomizes between fighting and conceding,  irrespective of  N  (depending on po), since whenever 
such randomization is taking place, the evolution of p, is governed by the relationship pi  = p/ bt -  p/b. 
Suppose  that we have  n contests  left to play in the game.  We will develop  a bound  on the expected 
length of time that there will be fighting, if the (weak) incumbent adopts the (nonequilibrium) strategy of never 
conceding,  and the entrants follow their equilibrium strategies. 
E[total  time fighting]=  Z_=,  E[time  fighting in contest k] 
='_=,  E[time  fighting in contest k and entrant k is tough] 
+ E[time  fighting in contest k and k is weak] 
_=  I qo+_=  E[time  fighting in contest k and k is weak]'nq?+K. 
The last inequality follows  from the previous paragraph-the  total time fighting weak opponents  is bounded 
by K, because whenever the opponent  is weak and is fighting, the probability p must be moving. 
Hence by following the strategy of fighting all the way to the end, starting with n stages left and against 
the equilibrium strategies of the entrants, the weak incumbent will net an expected value of 
aE [time not fighting] -E  [time fighting] = an -  (a +1 )  E [time fighting] 
which, by the previous estimate, is no less than 
n(a-(a+1)q?)-(a+1)K. 
For n sufficiently large, under the hypothesis that qo  < a/(a  + 1), this exceeds one.  Since the optimal response 
by the weak incumbent must do at least this well, we know that for all sufficiently large n, v,,(p?) > 1, which 
is what we wanted.  The remainder of (viii) follows trivially. 
vn  is  nondecreasing in  n.  To  complete  the  analysis,  we  establish  that  v,, is  nondecreasing  in  n.  If 
vn-I(p"  ) '  1, then  vn  (p") = a - (a + 1)qo  +v,_,(pn  ).  Moreover, the condition  v,,_1(p"  )1  requires that qo  < 
a/(a  + 1).  Hence we have the result. 
If vn_1(pn)  = O,  then the result is trivial. Hence we have left the case where O< v,,-1(p") <1.  Now assume 
inductively that vn1-  v,n2.  Looking at the differential equations (A.2), we see that for any termination point 
(p', 1), the curve for stage n -  1  will be more steeply sloped than the curve for stage n.  Moreover, looking at 568  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Figure A2, the  r function for stages n and n - 1 are the same, at least in the neighbourhood and to the left of 
the solution  for  n-1,  since  (as  vn-I(p ")>O)  we  know that the time left  upon  hitting (p', 1) from (p", q) 
depends on the evolution  of p, the differential equation for which is independent  of  n.  Combined with the 
induction hypothesis that v,n  '  v,2,  this means that the equilibrating terminal condition in stage n is moved 
leftward from the terminal condition for stage n -  1. Accordingly, for the same starting point (p", qo) in stages 
n and n -  1, the relevant curve in stage n lies everywhere above the curve for n -  1.  At stage n, then, there is 
higher probability that the entrant will concede  immediately.  And if the entrant does  concede  immediately, 
the incumbent receives a larger reward (from the value of continuation).  Thus v,, > v" 
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NOTES 
1. By  "dominate  play  of  the  game",  we  mean  that the  incumbent  will,  in  equilibrium, maintain its 
reputation regardless of how the entrants act, and so the entrants' equilibrium play is given by an easily solved 
optimization problem. 
2.  Kreps and Wilson (1982) consider the case where qo = 0.  Milgrom and Roberts (1982) have a somewhat 
richer structure of payoffs, but the ones given here will suffice to make our points. 
3.  For the rest of the paper, we will ignore all such knife-edge cases. 
4.  If p0 < b/(b  + 1), the first entry occurs in the first round of the game.  If p?>  b/(b  + 1), the first entry 
occurs at the earliest date that the entrant is strong. 
5.  One can also scale up the payoffs to the entrants, but this is clearly irrelevant. 
6.  It is important that rewards be proportional to the amount of time left.  The analysis would change 
substantially if there were a fixed reward if the other side concedes  first, regardless of when the concession 
takes place.  Also, throughout this paper we will be less than perfectly formal.  The reader may be troubled by 
our use of a continuous time game, for example.  But note that this game can be viewed as a one-shot selection 
by each side of a "concession time"-a  time at which one will concede if the other side has not done so first. 
This formulation is perfectly legitimate, and the analysis that follows  describes an equilibrium for it. 
7.  Of  course,  informational  linkage  "forces" the  incumbent to  concede,  if  at all,  at times  which  are 
perfectly correlated among the contests.  Under informational isolation,  concession  in the different contests 
could take place at, say, independently distributed times. 
8.  Since we did not restrict the strategy space of the incumbent so that concession  in all contests must 
take place  simultaneously,  we  must say what happens  should  the incumbent concede  in some,  but not all, 
contests.  At this point, entrants all assess probability one that the incumbent (i) is weak and (ii) will concede 
everywhere immediately, and the incumbent (if weak) does concede everywhere. The careful reader can check 
that this out-of-equilibrium behaviour supports the equilibrium we have given. 
9.  Cases of asymmetries of these and other sorts may be treated in a sequel. 
10. The reader may be concerned with our less than completely formal style, especially since the general 
theory of games in continuous time is underdeveloped.  A completely tight formalization of all the analysis we 
give in this section is possible,  using one of two game forms.  In the first, periods of "real time", the lengths 
of which are determined by the minima of stopping times chosen independently by players, are interspersed 
with periods of discrete, fictitious time, in which players react to each others' actions.  In the second, players 
choose  sets of stopping times, where, in particular, each entrant chooses  a time at which it will concede  if k 
or more of its fellow entrants have conceded, for each k = 0, . .,  N -  1.  We leave all these formal details to the 
interested reader. 
11. Recall that clocks  run backwards in this model,  so  that the maximum of  two  stopping times is a 
stopping time, etc. 
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